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ABSTRACT
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A DIGITAL
INFORMATION SECURITY SERVICE FOR PHYSICAL
DOCUMENTS
SEPTEMBER 2015
XUE YU
B.Sc., NORTHEAST PETROLEUM UNIVERSITY
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Tilman Wolf
This thesis presents a hybrid information security approach for data on physical
documents. This system, called CryptoPaper, allows portions of a physical document
be printed with a machine-readable code. This code contains original data and
related information security properties. To read this code and access the encoded
data, a scanning device with suitable image recognition technology is used. Using
a cloud-based access control system, it can be ensured that only authorized users
can interpret the machine-readable code and additional security properties can be
verified. This thesis specifically explained key management mechanism, which is
designed to achieve integrity, confidentiality and authenticity.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Information security become a crucial issue especially in business or government
domain [1]. And papper document are widely used in these area even personal
use. Usually these documents contains sensitive information which associated with
information security. For instance, personal information(SSN, date of birth, finacal
issues, etc.), business secret(biding price, confidentiality agreement, etc). Current
ways to protect these sensitive information on physical document is either to shred
after use or to save in a safe place. But according to social media, organizations are
not doing well regarding this aspect. In 2007 Dec, Company paid $50,000 penalty
for tossing consumers credit report tossing consumers credit report information in
unsecured dumpster [2]. In 2011 May, DYPD counterterrorism documents found in
trash [3]. In 2013 Jan, Medical group fined $140K for tossing patients’ health records
into public dump [4]. In these cases, companies exposed privacy in both personal and
governmental way which may cause potential financial problems or political issues.
As a result a realiable method need to be developed to protect sensitive informa-
tion especially which need to be printed out in physical document.
1
1.2 Motivation
The traditional way of implementing information security with physical docu-
ments cost too much and has limitation in revoking access. For example, proper
disposal of sensitive documents, tamper-evident paper or physical access control,
ect, is expensive to implement for businesses. Once documents have been issued,
it is difficult to revoke acess, which presents a potential for information leaks and
insider attacks.
An alternative to physical documents is an all-digital document management sys-
tem. In such an environment, document aceess can be fully controlled, tracked, and
audited. However, such systems are complex to implement unless all entities access-
ing these documents commit to the same process. In scenarios, where documents
need to cross organizational boundaries-while maintaining the necessary security
properties-an all-digital solution becomes even more challenging. In addition, hybrid
security approaches, where physical security properties(eg., locked file cabinet) can
be combined with digital security properties (eg., access revocation), have not yet
been deployed.
This thesis presents a hybrid information security approach for data on physical
documents [5]. A system called CryptoPaper, allows portions of a physical doc-
uments be printed with a machine-readable code [6]. Only autherized people or
organizations can have the access right to read the code. This code is encrypted
with AES encryption algorithm and then turned into a two dimensional QR code.
Once been created, comes along with a 128 bits symmetrical key which is saved in
cloud database as well as the information of the code creater. At the same time cloud
2
Figure 1.1. CryptoPaper System Overview.
database will record this code ID and send back the ID number to application which
is kept in the meta-information of this QR code. During information recovering,
after verifying user’s identity CyptoPaper system will look up for the key to decrypt
this code which based on the user’s access right and the meta-information from the
physical document.
This innovative method can keep the information safely even the physical paper
is stolen or the cloud database is hacked. For the cipher text is saved in the physical
document and the key is stored at seperated database. Beyond that, this thesis
presents a role-based access control key management. It makes key management
flexible and secure. For the access right is not assigned to a specific user but a role.
If there is any position modification, the employee who is no longer wroking at the
assigned postion has no longer access right.
3
1.3 Problem Statement
In order to make the whole system work flexibly and securely there are sev-
eral problems need to be designed and implemented to meet the requirements of
CryptoPaper system. This section states those promblems and the solutions will be
propsed in next few chapters.
• A stable and flexibale database schema need to be designed to ensure reading
and fetching data in fast speed and cost less resource.
• Confidentiality. The most significant concern is to protect the key from disclo-
sure to unauthorized parties.
• Integrity. Protecting information from being modified by unauthorized parties.
And make sure there is no errors during the process of transmission.
• Authenticity. Ensuring that authorized parties are able to access the informa-
tion in fast speed when needed. And make sure the code is genuienly created
by the original user.
• How to enable ”CryptoPaper code generation service” provide code to multiple
applications at same time.
• Eanble access rovoke. Ensuring access right can be be changed by authorized
user. On the other hand, the user who is not authorized cannot make any
change of the created code.
4
1.4 Contribution
This thesis mainly focus on how to provide a secure code generation service in
CryptoPaper system which serve as a backbone of the whole project.
• It provides a role-access-control database schema which assign access right of
the key to specific role instead of specific user, which enables the implementa-
tion of access revocation in case users change roles or organizations. By simply
removing a role from a user’s profile, their access to this role’s codes can be
removed.
• Achieving confidentiality by encrypting the sensitive data in the document
using AES. For each QR code, CryptoPaper system use a randomly generated
128-bit key and encrypt data in 128-bit block using the Electronic Codebook
(ECB) mode. The key is stored in the cloud database that manages access
control. And also during transmission this 128-bit random key is protected by
SSL protocol.
• To achieve integrity and authenticity, a digital signature mechanism is de-
ployed. Based on the ciphertext which is encrypted by AES algorithm a digital
signature is created and attached at the end of ciphertext and then encode
together with ciphertext into QR code. When reading the code, the signature
need to be verifiedto ensure data has not been modified and it is created by
original creator.
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• In order to implement CryptoPaper code generation service for multiple appli-
cations at same time. This service is separated from Microsoft Word applica-
tion. It runs at its own so that user can encrypt data in different applications.
• User can revoke access right even if the code is created. By achieving this, cloud
database record the creater’s identity information and verify before making any
changes of the access right. So unauthorized user would not make modification
of the code.
1.5 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the back-
ground and related work on CyptoPater system. This chapter is the overview of
CyptoPaper system including the whole architecture, specification of code generation
part and inforamtion recovery part. Chapter 3 focus on the design of ”CryptoPaper
code generation service” in detail. This chapter discusses the solutions of previous
concerns such as database design, how to achieve CIA properties, separating service
from Micsoft Word and access revoke. Chapter 4 provides current results of how the
system works. Chapter 5 presents the future work.
6
CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Overview and System Operation
This thesis presents a hybrid information security approach for data on physical
documents. This system, called CryptoPaper, allows portions of a physical document
be printed with a machine-readable code [7]. This code contains original data and
related information security properties. To read this code and access the encoded
data, a scanning device with suitable image recognition technology is used. Using
a cloud-based access control system, it can be ensured that only authorized users
can interpret the machine-readable code and additional security properties can be
verified [8].
The operation of CryptoPaper is illustrated in Figure 2.1. There are three major
steps in the creation and use of CryptoPater documents:
1. Creation of document: When creating a CryptoPaper document, special soft-
ware (in our case, a Microsoft Word plugin) is used to replace sensitive in-
formation with a 2-dimensional code (in our case, a QR code) [9]. The code
contains an encrypted version of the data that needs to be protected as well as
meta-information that is necessary for decryption [10]. The code is printed on
7
Figure 2.1. System architecure overview.
the physical document instead of the sensitive information and the digital key
to access the information is stored in a cloud database.
2. Management of access control: Access control to a CryptoPaper document
can now be realized through both physical constraints (e.g., by locking the
document in a file cabinet) as well as virtual constraints (e.g., by limiting access
to the key to decode information). The cloud database enables management
of the latter type of access control. In particular, it is possible to dynamically
update the list of users who have access to a document, which also enables the
revocation of access (e.g., when an employee leaves an organization).
8
3. Reading of sensitive information with scanner: To access the encoded informa-
tion on a CryptoPaper, a user has to have physical access to the document and
has access rights to access the key from the cloud database in order to decrypt
any encoded information. To implement this process in a convenient manner,
we have developed a scanner system that automatically detects coded regions
on a paper, fetches keys for which a user has access, and substitutes the codes
with cleartext information on the display.
This process of protecting sensitive information in CryptoPaper exhibits the fol-
lowing convenient properties:
• Only authorized users can access encoded information since both the physical
document and access permissions to the digital key are necessary.
• The sensitive information is only stored in the code on the physical document
(and not in the cloud database, which only holds the key to decrypt the code).
Thus, a user does not need to entrust sensitive information to the database
provider (and hacking attempts on the database will not leak information).
• The scanner can use established techniques to identify users (e.g., password
login, fingerprint reader). This information is then used by the cloud database
to ensure that decryption keys for codes are only provided to those users who
have access rights to that code.
• The full range of information security properties (confidentiality, integrity, au-
thenticity) can be implemented in the codes (assuming an appropriate public
key management system).
9
Figure 2.2. Word Object Model.
2.2 Generation of CryptoPaper
To generate the QR codes using CryptoPaper in a convenient fashion, we de-
veloped a Microsoft Word plug-in that manages the process described above. The
plug-in enables users to mark sensitive text that needs to be replaced by a QR code.
User needs to create an account in CryptoPaper system and log in so that to save
user’s code id and access right in CryptoPaper database.
2.2.1 Building pulg-in with Microsoft Visual Studio
To build this plug in, Microsoft Visual Studio provides deverlopers a rich and
powerful programming environment to interact with object model by using .NET
framework. Figure 2.2 shows the several object models.
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• The Application Object represents the Word application, and is the parent of
all of the other objects. Its members usually apply to Word as a whole. You
can use its properties and methods to control the Word environment.
• The Document Object is central to programming Word. When you open an
existing document or create a new document, you create a new Document
object, which is added to the Word Documents collection. The document
that has the focus is called the active document and is represented by the
Application object’s ActiveDocument property.
• The Selection Object represents the area that is currently selected. When you
perform an operation in the Word user interface, such as bolding text, you
select the text and then apply the formatting. The Selection object is always
present in a document; if nothing is selected, the Selection object represents
the insertion point. The Selection object can also be multiple noncontiguous
blocks of text.
• The Range Object represents a contiguous area in a document, and is defined
by a starting character position and an ending character position. You are not
limited to a single Range object; you can define multiple Range objects in the
same document.
• The Bookmark object is similar to the Range object in that it represents a
contiguous area in a document, with both a starting position and an ending
position. You use bookmarks to mark a location in a document, or as a con-
tainer for text in a document. A Bookmark object can consist of the insertion
11
Figure 2.3. CrptoPaper Login System Plug in Editing Software Word.
point alone or be as large as the entire document. You can also define multiple
bookmarks in a document.
Our CryptoPaper system uses application-level module to control the whole Word
environment. We use this class to perform tasks such as accessing the object model
of the Microsoft Office host application, customizing the user interface (UI) of the
application, and connect information in our add-in to Amazon RDS cloud system.
And also, the selection-level module realizes the function of encrypting selected plain-
text and changing it into QR-code. Figure 2.3 shows the user log in interface when
CryptoPater user need to generate the code.
12
Figure 2.4. Word plug-in for generating CryptoPaper codes in document.
When generating the substitution code, the user can select the security properties
that should be enabled in the code. The user can also select who can access the code
(i.e., the roles within the organization—see below). The encryption key for the
generated code is then automatically stored in the access control database. Figure
2.4 illustrates a user want to encrypt the Date of Birth information when editing a
prescription.
2.2.2 AES Encryption
Before turning sesitive information into a two dementional code, our system
choose AES encryption to encrypt the sensitive information first. AES is a cryp-
tographic algorithm that often used to protect electronic data. Specifically, AES is
13
Figure 2.5. AES Encryption in ECB Mode.
an iterative, symmetric-key block cipher that can use keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits,
and encrypts and decrypts data in blocks of 128 bits (16 bytes). Unlike public-key
ciphers, which use a pair of keys, symmetric-key ciphers use the same key to encrypt
and decrypt data. Encrypted data returned by block ciphers have the same number
of bits that the input data had [11].
We use the Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption to encrypt each block
individually. Any blocks of plaintext that are identical and in the same message,
or that are in a different message encrypted with the same key, will be transformed
into identical cipher text blocks. Even though this mode opens the door for multiple
security exploits, we still choose this since this is a faster encryption mode over the
14
other modes. In order to further secure it we use additional layers of security like
encoding the cipher text into QR codes and applying a digital signature which makes
it difficult for the attacker to obtain the data or modify it. The mode will enhance
user experience by decreasing overall latency time in querying the database and the
reaction speed of the scanner [12].
2.2.3 QR Code
The 2-dimensional code used to store information in CryptoPaper documents has
several important design requirements. The code needs to have sufficient density to
store sensitive information (and meta-information to decode it), needs to be machine-
readable, and needs to be generated in an easy manner.
We use Quick Response (QR) codes for our system. QR codes are 2-dimensional,
square bar codes that were invented by the Japanese corporation Denso Wave in
1994. QR codes can represent digital information, have options for error correction,
and can be read effectively through image processing techniques. Since QR codes
are widely used today and are based on mature technology, we use them to represent
information on CryptoPaper documents.
There are a range of configuration options for QR codes. The information encoded
by a QR code can be made up of four standard types (“modes”) of data: numeric,
alphanumeric, byte/binary, Kanji. Error correction codes (ECC) can be used in four
“levels,” namely, 7 percent or less (level L), 15 percent (level M) or less, 25 percent
(level Q) or less and 30 percent (level H) or less. The size of the code (“version”)
varies from 1 to 40. Version 1 is a 21 X 21 code and can store 128 bits. When the
version increases, the size of the code increases by 4 in each dimension, along with
15
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Figure 2.6. Data bits in QR codes of different versions.
the amount of data that can be stored. For example, version 40 is a 177 X 177 code
that can store 10,208 bits of data (with level L error correction). Example QR codes
are shown in Figure 2.6.
A key question for our system is if a QR code can store information at a sufficient
level of density to replace a region of sensitive text with its encrypted digital repre-
sentation and the necessary meta-information to recover the text. For a typical text
document (Calibri font, 11 pt font, 1.5-line spacing), we measured an information
density of around 200 bits per inch2. For comparison, we printer QR codes with a
density of approximately 32 code dots per inch. In this case, a version-1 QR code
(72 bits, 0.4225 inch2) has a data density of 170 bits per inch. For version-2 QR
code (128 bits,0.5625 inch2) has a data density of 228 bits per inch2. For higher ver-
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Figure 2.7. Number of QR codes that fit in space of version-40 QR code.
sions, the data density continues to increase since the overhead for finder patterns
can be amortized over a larger code. Thus QR codes of version 2 and larger have
information densities that exceed that of typical printed text on paper.
While the data density can increased with higher version of the QR code, there
are limits to the ability to recover information with the scanner system. In order to
explore this tradeoff, we consider a fixed size area and fill it with multiple QR codes
of one type. Figure 2.7 shows the number of QR codes that fit into the area of one
QR code of version 40. Figure 2.8 shows then the number of bits that are stored in
that area. In this figure, we distinguish between the theoretical amount of data that
can be placed and the practical amount of data that can be recovered successfully
with our scanner. As the figure shows, very large codes of version 30 and higher
17
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Figure 2.8. Data bits in area of version-40 QR code (theoretical and practical when
read with scanner).
cannot be read and thus the practical amount of information stored in them is zero.
The largest amount of recoverable data in the area can be achieved when choosing
QR codes of version 3, 6, 10, or 17. We choose QR code version 17 in our prototype.
The information that is stored in the QR code in a CryptoPaper document con-
tains not only the encrypted version of the cleartext information, but also “meta-
information” that is used by the scanner to interpret and identify which code it is
reading. This information is necessary to query the cloud database for the decryption
key.
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CryptoPaper
version
(4 bits)
Code header length
(8 bits)
Security
attributes
(5 bits)
Total length (TL)
15 bits
Identification (Code ID)
(128 bits)
Encryption method (EM)
(8 bits)
Organization
(16 bits)
Cyclic redundancy check
for header
(8 bits)
Data (Ciphertext)
(variable size)
Digital signature
(1024 bits)
Cyclic redundancy check for data
(16 bits)
Padding
(variable size)
Figure 2.9. Meta-information in QR code.
Our QR codes have the structure shown in the Figure 2.9, which consists of both
meta-information and data. Several fields are necessary to define the structure of
the code (header length, total length, padding).
• CryptoPaper version: Version of CryptoPaper system to ensure forward com-
patibility.
• Security attributes: Flags indicating which security properties (described be-
low) are implemented in a specific code,
• Code ID: Randomly generated identifier of QR code, which is used as search
index in access control database to obtain decryption key.
• Encryption method: Field to specify which encryption algorithm and settings
was used.
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• Ciphertext: Encrypted version of sensitive data. The maximum length of the
ciphertext depends on the code version used in the system.
• Digital signature: Depending on the security properties that need to be achieved
with a given QR code, a digital signature may be included.
• Cyclic redundancy code for data: CRC checksum to verify integrity of code.
2.3 Information Recovery
The scanning device makes an optical recording of a CryptoPaper document,
identifies any QR codes, accesses key information to decrypt code data, and displays
the cleartext information as a substitute for the QR codes. Using this process, an
authorized user can see the document with its original cleartext information on the
scanner.
2.3.1 QR Code Detection and Processing
The first step in the process is detecting QR codes in the recorded image. The
design of the QR code enables easy identification of such codes in images based on
the finder and alignment patterns (see Figure 2.10 as described in [13]).
In our implementation, we capture video from a camera as a sequence of images
that are processed sequentially. We use ZXing (“zebra crossing”) to detect QR codes
and decode them [14]. ZXing is an open-source, multi-format 1D/2D barcode image
processing library implemented in Java with ports to other languages. The software
can detect whether there are any QR codes in a video frame. For each of these QR
20
Figure 2.10. QR code finder pattern.
codes, we use the package com.google.zxing.qrcode.decoder in ZXing to decode
them and obtain the data and meta-information stored in them.
Once a QR code has been decoded, the scanner displays the cleartext information
in the location of the QR codes in video stream. We use the WebcamPanel.Painter
class in our webcam library to paint the QR codes in the video with semitrans-
parent red rectangle areas. Then, we display the decoded and decrypted informa-
tion in these areas with a different color. First, we need to find the positions of
several QR codes in the scanned content. This can be done through the package
com.google.zxing.qrcode.detector in ZXing. The software recognizes the po-
sition of QR code by obtaining the coordinates of three finder patterns. Then, it
returns the coordinates of three corners of QR codes. After calculating all these
parameters, we use the fillRect method in the Java Graphics library to fill the
21
Figure 2.11. Scanner login interface.
specified rectangle. Then, we implement WebcamPanel.Painter to paint the infor-
mation inside the QR codes on the rectangles. Thus, we can clearly visualize the QR
codes being replaced by the actual information in the scanned content.
2.3.2 Connection with Access Control Database
To obtain the cryptographic key to decode a QR code, we use the Java Database
Connectivity (JDBC). JDBC provides methods for querying and updating data in
a database and allows the scanner to connect to our Amazon RDS using JDBC in
Java.
The query to the database, a user first has to log into the scanner system (see
Figure 2.11). The login system connects securely over the Internet using SSL to the
CryptoPaper database. Login is denied to a user who is not registered in the system.
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The system hashes the passwords of users (and other sensitive information) before
storing them in the database.
Once the QR code has been read and the cryptographic key has been obtained by
an authorized user, the scanner can decode the cryptographic information stored in
the code. Depending on the security properties implemented in the code, the scanner
can not only display the cleartext information, but can also verify integrity and
authenticity of the information. The security properties of the decoded information
can be displayed in the QR code area in addition to the cleartext information.
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM SECURITY DESIGN
3.1 Key Management
We use AES algorithm to encrypt and decrypt data, it is a symmetric key. So it
is the same key involves in both generation and detection part. That’s why we need
to put this key in a safe and convenient place so that when an authorized reader
need to lookup for the key, it is easy to fetch.
We choose cloud database which stores the cryptographic keys associated with
every QR code used in CryptoPaper. Both the code identifier and the encryption key
used for sensitive data in the code are generated when the QR code is created. The
generation software stores both in the access control database, along with information
about who can access the key. Figure 3.1 show the overview of whole process.
When a scanner attempts to read a code, it requests the decryption key from
the database. To enable a lookup, the code identifier, which is part of the QR code
meta-information, is provided to the database as a search index. The information
left in the QR code is shown in Figure3.2. ”Code id” is an index for AES key to be
created and saved in database. Digital signature is used for identity integrity and
authentication which I will introduce in Security Property part. Cipher text is a
variable size of encrypted data.
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Figure 3.1. Key Management Overview.
It is important to note that the access control database only manages code iden-
tifiers and cryptographic keys. The database does not store the data encrypted in a
code. That data remains solely on the printed CryptoPaper document.
3.2 Security properties
For information security, CIA triad is the heart of it which involes Confidentiality,
Integrity and Authenticity. This project is designed to acheive these properies and
implemented. [15]
3.2.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality refers to preventing the disclosure of information to unauthorized
individuales or systems. Measures undertaken to ensure confidentiality are designed
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Figure 3.2. Information stored in single QR code.
to prevent sensitive information from reaching the wrong people, while making sure
that the right people can in fact get it: Access must be restricted to those authorized
to view the data in question. We achieve confidentiality by encrypting the sensitive
data in the document using AES algorithm. For each QR code, we use a randomly
generated 128-bit key and encrypt data in 128-bit block using the Electronic Code-
book(ECB) mode. As well as the password login required and SSL(Secure Sockets
Layer) mechanism is deployed during key transmission [16].
SSL is cryptographic protocols designed to provide communication security over
the Internet [17]. It uses asymmetric cryptography to authenticate the conunterparty
with whom they are communicating, and to exchange a symmetric key.
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Figure 3.3. SSL Mechanism.
Public-key refers to a cryptographic mechanism. It has been named public-key
to differentiate it from the traditional and more intuitive cryptographic mechanism
known as: symmetric-key, shared secret, secret-key and also called private-key.
Symmetric-key cryptography is a mechanism by which the same key is used for
both encrypting and decrypting; it is more intuitive because of its similarity with
what you expect to use for locking and unlocking a door: the same key. This char-
acteristic requires sophisticated mechanisms to securely distribute the secret-key to
both parties.
In our case, we upload our symmetric key to cloud database after cloud database
destribuing a public key. After encrypting with the public key our original symmetric
key turn into a dual encrypted key. Only determined cloud database can decrypt
the transmitted data because only the real organization own the private key. That
ensure only authorized organization can get the information we transmitted.
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Figure 3.4. Key management with confidentiality property.
When decrypting it, user need to first verify their identity. Then CryptoPaper
database check whether this user has access right to read this code. If he/she is
permitted, this user get key from cloud database with SSL protocol protection. The
process is showed in Figure3.5. So even if the cloud database is attacked, the attacker
still cannot get the sensitive information, since the document(ciphertext) is hold by
creator.
3.2.2 Intergrity and Authenticity
Intergrity involves maintaining the consistency, accuracy, and trustworthiness of
data over its entire life cycle. Data must not be changed in transit, and steps must
be taken to ensure that data cannot be altered by unauthorized people.
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Figure 3.5. Decrypting Code by Acheiving confidentiality property.
It is necessary to ensure that the data is genuine. It is also important for au-
thenticity to vaildate that both parties involved are who they claim to be. In the
other hand, if someone or some organization who has created the code previously
but denies to admit he/she has created this particular code. A method need to be
worked out to avoid this kind of situation.
Digital signature [18] is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the integrity
and authenticity of a digital message or document. Proving that this message or
document is effectively coming from a given sender, much like a signature on a paper
document. For instance, the sender uses its private key to encrypt the message
or document, sender then sends the message or document along with its public
key. Since sender’s public key [19] is the only key that can decrypt this message
or document, a successful decryption concstitutes a Digital Signature Verfication,
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Figure 3.6. Digital Signature Mechanism.
meaning that there is no doubt that it is sender’s private key that encrypted the
message or document. So it ensure that this message or docuemnt is came from the
sender, at the same time, sender cannot deny it is him/her who sent this message or
document.
In this project, I first encrypt original text with randomly generated AES key and
hash the ciphertext by hash function. Using creator’s own private key to encrypt
the hash value then turn into creator’s digital signature which is attached to the
ciphertext.
A authorized reader can first check whether this code is the original version or
whether is created by creator, that is, whether it is genuine. The process goes into two
parts: first fetch creator’s public key from database and decrypt the digital signature
which turn back into a hash value. The second part is to hash the ciphertext by using
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Figure 3.7. Achieving Integrity and Authenticity by Using Digital Signature.
same hash function to get a hash value. Then compare these two hash value. If they
are excatly same, it shows the code is created by creator and no error or modification.
Figure3.17 shows the process.
3.3 Access Control Database
The access control database, which manages the keys to decode QR codes and
which ensures that only authorized users can access those keys, is another critical
component in CryptoPaper. This database provides a logical connection between
the QR codes generation process and the scanning system that attempts to interpret
a QR code. The main functions of this database are to implement key management,
role-based access control.
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Figure 3.8. Decypting Code when Using Digital Signature.
3.3.1 Role-Based Access Control
To enable the implementation of typical security policies used in organizations,
we use role-based access control in CryptoPaper. Users are associated with roles
that enable access to certain types of QR codes. When generating codes, users can
determine which roles in their organization (or organizations that they interact with)
can access a code [20].
The use of role-based access control enables the implementation of access revo-
cation in case users change roles or organizations. By simply removing a role from a
user’s profile, their access to this role’s codes can be removed.
To make the database scalable, storage of code identifiers and cryptographic keys
can be done independently for each organization (unless roles cross organization
boundaries).
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Figure 3.9. Role-based Access Control.
3.3.2 Database Structure
We have implemented a CryptoPaper database in the Amazon cload Relational
Database. Figure 3.10 provides an overview of this database. The tables used in our
implementation are:
• The User info table contains basic user information.
Table 3.1. Users Info Table
Name Type Length Description
User id VARCHARE 45 Auto added, auto increment
usename VARCHAR 70 Use email as usename
first name VARCHAR 40 -
last name VARCHAR 40 -
is active BOOLEAN 1 Some user may deactivate the account
data joined DATETIME - The date and time user signed up
last login DATETIME - Auto added when user login
• When users log in, the user identifier and password they provide is verified
against the data stored in the User credential table.
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Figure 3.10. CryptoPaper access control database structure.
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Table 3.2. User credential Table
Name Type Length Description
User id VARCHAR 45 Auto added, auto increment
password VARCHAR 128 Encrypted by SHA-256
Salt VARCHAR 45 Use to hash the password
• The Digital Signature key table saves the public and private key pair, which
is used for digital signatures. The public and private key pair is generated when
a user registers in our system. The primary key, User id, in this table is the
foreign key of the User credential, User address and UserId RoleId tables.
Table 3.3. User Address Table
Name Type Length Description
User id VARCHAR 45 Auto added, auto increment
Building No. VARCHAR 45 Or Apt No.
Street VARCHAR 45 -
City VARCHAR 45 -
Zip VARCHAR 20 -
State VARCHAR 45 -
• The Role and Organization table saves every identified role in every identified
organization. Since every each organization may has same position, the primary
key Org id in Organization talbe is a foreign key of Role table. This schema
enhance the convenience and flexibility of adding or deleting role operation.
Table 3.4. Role Table
Name Type Length Description
Role id INT 11 Primary Key
Role name VARCHAR 45 -
Org id INT 11 Foreign Key
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Table 3.5. Organization Table
Name Type Length
Org id INT 11
Org name VARCHAR 45
Building No. VARCHAR 45
Street VARCHAR 45
City VARCHAR 45
Zip VARCHAR 11
State VARCHAR 11
• UserId RoleId table enable the access right is assigned to the specific role
instead of specific user.
• When a QR code ciphertext is created, the key is saved in the Key table and
the user can set the access right to the key, i.e., a key-role pair indicating which
role can read this specific key. This information is saved in the RoleId KeyId
table.
• At the same time, the creator user identifier is also recorded in the KeyId CreatorUserId
table to enable users to revoke a code’s access rights and retrieve their encryp-
tion history.
• A UserId KeyId view is created each time a query from a scanner is received
during the decryption process. This way, the scanner gets the entire authorized
user identifiers associated with a specific code with a single query.
We also use Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS) [21] to build
our database, which is a web service that makes it easy to set up, operate, and scale
a relational database in the cloud. It provides cost-efficient and resizable capacity
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Figure 3.11. Role Table in CryptoPaper Database to Perform Add/Delete Func-
tion.
Figure 3.12. UserId RoleId Table in CryptoSystem Database with Various Roles
in an Organization.
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Figure 3.13. RoleId KeyId Talbe in CryptoSystem Database Used to Provide Mul-
tiple Levels of Access.
Figure 3.14. RoleId KeyId, KeyId CreatedUserId tables in CryptoSystem
Database used to provide access rights.
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Figure 3.15. Get creator Id from Code
Id
Figure 3.16. Modify Role Key pair
while managing time-consuming database administration tasks, freeing you up to
focus on your applications and business.
Our implementation enables complete role-based access control, dynamic man-
agement of users and roles, and dynamic change of access rights for codes. Scanners
can access key information quickly, and invalid operation (e.g., duplicate uploading
of keys) can be detected and avoided.
3.3.3 Access Right Revocation
This database scheme also should allow to revoke the access right after code is
generated. By doing this, we need to first get the code Id then we find this specific key
and lookup KeyId CreatedUserId Table. Then compare whether the sent request
user is the same with creator for a specific key. If it is same, the column of this key
need to be modified.
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Figure 3.17. How Add-in Work with Microsoft Applications.
3.4 Separating CryptoPaper Service from Microsoft Word
CryptoPaper code generation service can run outside of Microsoft Word so that
muliple applications can use at same time.
3.4.1 How add-in work with Microsoft Office Application
When a user starts a Microsoft Office application, the application uses the de-
ployment manifest and the application manifest to locate and load the most current
version of the add-in assembly. The following illustration shows the basic architecture
of these add-ins.
The following steps occur when a user starts an application: The application
checks the registry for entries that identify add-ins that were created by using the
Office developer tools in Visual Studio. If the application finds these registry entries,
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the application loads VSTOEE.dll, which loads VSTOLoader.dll. These are unman-
aged DLLs that are the loader components for the Visual Studio 2010 Tools for Office
Runtime. VSTOLoader.dll loads the .NET Framework and starts the managed por-
tion of the Visual Studio Tools for Office runtime. The Visual Studio Tools for Office
runtime checks for manifest updates, and downloads the most recent application and
deployment manifests. The Visual Studio Tools for Office runtime performs a series
of security checks. If the add-in is trusted to run, the Visual Studio Tools for Office
runtime uses the deployment manifest and application manifest to check for assembly
updates. If a new version of the assembly is available, the runtime downloads the
new version of the assembly to the ClickOnce cache on the client computer. The
Visual Studio Tools for Office runtime creates a new application domain in which
to load the add-in assembly. The Visual Studio Tools for Office runtime loads the
add-in assembly into the application domain. The Visual Studio Tools for Office
runtime calls the RequestComAddInAutomationService method in your add-in, if
you have overridden it. You can optionally override this method to expose an object
in your add-in to other Microsoft Office solutions. The Visual Studio Tools for Of-
fice runtime calls the RequestService method in your add-in, if you have overridden
it. You can optionally override this method to extend a Microsoft Office feature by
returning an object that implements an extensibility interface. The Visual Studio
Tools for Office runtime calls the ThisAddInStartup method in your add-in. This
method is the default event handler for the Startup event.
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Figure 3.18. CryptoPaper Service Communication Process.
3.4.2 CryptoPaper Code Generation Service Communication Process
When user open document editing software eg. Microsoft Word the current user
need to log in his/her account if he/she has already signed up. Then he can call
CryptoPaper code generation service rather than generate code inside Word Appli-
cation, a interface shows up. And from Word, user can choose whatever he/she
wants to encrypt and send message to CryptoPaper service. Once CryptoPaper Ser-
vice receive message, service encrypt data with AES algorithm and create a digital
signature with creator’s private key. After the generation service will send back the
packet to Word. The process is shown on Figure 3.18.
To implement it we use ”SendMessage” API which is provide by Windows. First
pass the destination of this message. By identifing the applicaion we can choose
method from FindWindow class or GetProcess class. After the message is received,
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Figure 3.19. Seperated CryptoPaper
Service
Figure 3.20. Message Received from Word
it can be shown on the application textbox. then create CryptoPaper code then
pass back to Word. Figure 3.19 and Figure3.20 show the interface of seperated
CryptoPaper service.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
In this chapter, we shows the test results of key management module coordinates
with code generation part and information recovery part. And several scenarios which
to demonstrate how this system perform. Section 1 test whether an unathorized use
can use this system. Section 2 test whether a user can select different access right
by different roles. And how it works when detecting the codes. Section 3 test when
an unauthorized user want to change the access right. Section 4 test how the system
works when an authorized user want to change the access rightand how long time
takes to relfect to information recovery part.
4.1 User Log in Protection
CryptoPaper system was tested for confidentiality by checking if a unautho-
rized/unregistered user can log in to our system. The result expected was to deny
access even after multiple attempts and hence the system remains confidential only
to registered users. Figure 4.1 demonstrates when a unanthorized/unregistered user
get denied by this system during code generation since there is account informa-
tion of this user in CryptoPaper database. Figure 4.2 shows the same scenario in
information recovery module.
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Figure 4.1. Login Access Denied for Unauthorized Users during CryptoPaper Gen-
eration.
Figure 4.2. Login Access Denied for Unauthorized Users during Information Re-
covery Module.
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Figure 4.3. User Selection of Access Levels of the First QR Code during CryptoPa-
per generation.
4.2 Access Level Changes by the User
We test our system for different access levels set by a user. As shown in the
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 the user selects the access to be provided for the first QR
code only to a HR or a professor in organization named UMASS and the second
QR code only to a HR who belongs to the organization named UMASS. The result
expected at the Information recovery module was to allow access only for a user who
belongs to UMASS and is a professor or a HR. The result is shown in Figure 4.4.
4.3 Check If One User Can Change the Access Rights of
Codes Created by Another User
To check if the system is reliable and robust we perform this test if one user can
change the access rights of codes created by another user.Figure 4.6 shows the test
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Figure 4.4. User Selection of Access Levels of the Second QR Code during Cryp-
toPaper generation.
Figure 4.5. The User wolf Who is a Professor in UMASS Is not Authorized to Read
the Second QR Code But Can Read the First QR code.
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Figure 4.6. User Denied Access to Change the Access Rights of a Code Owned by
Another User.
result during code generation. The expected result during detection is to deny access
and the result obtained is shown in Figure 4.5 .
4.4 Check If the Updates in a Database Are Reflected in the
Recovery Module
We check the performance of our system and reliability by checking if the updates
in a database are properly reflected. To do this we denied the access rights to anyone
belonging to organization UMASS to view the code. The user wolf, who is a professor
in UMASS was logged in to read the code after this change. The expected result was
to deny access to wolf to view the code. The expected result is shown in Figure 4.7
and Figure 4.8. The updates only takes around 3 seconds in inforamation recovery
part.
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Figure 4.7. Access Rights Changed by the Same User during Code Generation.
Figure 4.8. The User wolf Can No Longer View the Code.
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Figure 4.9. Check when digital signature is changed.
4.5 Check If Digital Signature is been Maliciously Modified
After generating a normal code, we copy the character inside the QR code but
change the digital signature see Figure4.9. The result show in Figure4.9. If someone
change any part of the data, the digital signature will be changed. So a valid digital
signature will guarantee the genuine of the data.
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Figure 4.10. Show Original Text if it is
valid signature
Figure 4.11. without valid Digital Signature
4.6 Check Whether does the Code Which Generated by
Seperated CryptoPaper Service
A seperated CryptoPaper service should work as well as the the function inside
Microsoft Word.Figure4.12show the operation when call independent service. After
generating the code show in the document. Test it whether could be read with
authorized account and unauthorized account. The result is shown in Figure4.13
and Figure4.14.
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Figure 4.12. Generate Code from Independent CryptoPaper Service
Figure 4.13. Show Original Code gener-
ated by Independent Service with autho-
rized reader account
Figure 4.14. Code generated by Independent Ser-
vice with unauthorized reader account
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Throughout this thesis, we have designed a digital information security service for
physical documents, which is successfully implemented. In Chapter one, the back-
groud and the motivation of this project were discussed. In addition, the problems
what we had to address and the challenges what we achived are briefly explained.
The second chapter of the thesis talk about the relevant work, which is about gen-
eration and information recovery part.
The third chapter of this thesis explains my main work, system security design.
The key management tells how and where the symmetric key be generated and where
to pass and save. And also how to manage the asymmetric key for digital signature.
Second part in this chapter is about how to achive and ensure security properties
which are confidentiality, intergrity and authenticity. Third part is related how to
design a role-based access control database schema to not depend on specific person
but role to access the key. The forth part is about how to separate the service from
Microsoft Word and can provide service to multiple applications parallel.
The evaluation work are implemented in forth chapter. This service passed all
the tests and proved its functionality.
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